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Subverting Sovereignty’s Voluntarism: Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Cahoots 
 
 





Sovereignty’s lingering commitment to voluntarism and the limitations of the voluntarist approach are 
exposed by the crisis of authority represented by contradictory claims to ultimate authority on the part 
of the Court of Justice and national courts. Whilst it is uncontroversial to assert that both pluralism 
and subsidiarity pose significant challenges to state sovereignty, this chapter argues that pluralism and 
subsidiarity not only threaten sovereignty because they allow for the re-allocation of authority to 
institutions other than those of the nation state but also because they call into question sovereignty’s 
fundamental assumption that authority is dominated by will to the neglect of countervailing 
considerations. They offer solutions to this crisis of authority which finally tackle the problem of 
voluntarism, by deflecting focus away from the will and towards the good (higher moral principles), 




Disaffection with institutional sovereignty in the eighteenth century led to the rise of popular and state 
sovereignty, but this movement has been reversed in the European context: expressions of sovereignty 
as ultimately abiding in the people or in the state have given way to expressions of sovereignty as finally 
reposing in institutions. Whereas prior to the eighteenth century those sovereign institutions were 
parliaments, this time they are courts: the Court of Justice asserts its own sovereignty-based authority 
to make claims about the status of European law without relying on the sovereignty of the European 
Union, which in turn prompts national constitutional courts to counter that they are the institutional 
keepers of ultimate legal authority within the nation state. The shift towards institutional sovereignty 
represented by the battle of the sovereign courts forces law to come to terms with sovereignty’s hard 
edges in a way was not previously necessary when sovereignty was vested abstractly in ‘the people’ or 
‘the state’. Now we have conflicting legal answers to the same legal problem being produced by courts 
which consider themselves to be sovereign, and since law loses much of its credibility, effectiveness 
and raison d’être  when it conduces to uncertainty, sovereignty has to give. There is nothing unusual in 
the suggestion that the concept of sovereignty is undergoing significant challenges in our times;1 the 
novelty of this chapter lies in its argument that the reason that these challenges are so devastating is that 
they threaten sovereignty’s fundamental assumption, namely, voluntarism.2  
Simply stated, voluntarism assumes that the will takes priority over the intellect. If I am faced 
with choosing between two options, I should be governed by my unreasoned preference or instinctive 
will rather than allow myself to engage in a rational reflection about which of the two options is the 
more reasonable or morally defensible or kindly course of action. Voluntarism now has supporters who 
proclaim the dominance of the will in the disciplines of psychology,3 philosophy,4 metaphysics,5 and 
so on, but its earliest manifestation, as will be further discussed in Part 1, was in the form of theological 
voluntarism, from which political voluntarism and theories of sovereignty take their cue. Theories of 
pluralism, meanwhile, purport to solve the battle of the sovereign European courts by urging that those 
courts should count other considerations as more weighty than sovereign will, by conceiving of their 
authority as ordered towards the protection of certain higher moral principles or the promotion of 
 
1 Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 
2003). 
2 The term was first coined by Ferdinand Tönnies: cf. Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Association (trans. Charles Loomis, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1995). 
3 William James, The Principles of Psychology (Dover Publications, 1950). 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (ed. Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollingdale, Vintage Books, 1968).  
5 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation (trans. EFJ Payne, Dover Publications, 1969).  
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reasoned dialogue or the cultivation of a spirit of co-operation. Since theories of pluralism reconceive 
of authority by relegating the importance of the will, pluralism thereby jeopardises sovereignty’s 
voluntarism. Theories of subsidiarity double down on this threat by summarily dismissing the notion of 
static, monolithic sovereign institutions in favour of a problematization of authority in which 
institutions at various levels must compete for the privilege of decision-making. Where sovereignty 
understands authority as an entitlement that one claims and thereby assumes for oneself, subsidiarity 
bestows decision-making authority commensurate with the capacity of the decision-maker to achieve 
certain goals. Thus, there was a terrible irony in the fact that when the European principle of subsidiarity 
was initially introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht, it was heralded as the saviour of the sovereignty of 
the member states,6 even though the specifics of its design and implementation systematically favour 
the Union institutions.7  
Although pluralism and subsidiarity come at the problem of authority from different 
perspectives and with different aims, and although a whole other chapter could be written on the 
differences between them, this short contribution makes the point that, notwithstanding their 
differences, pluralism and subsidiarity act in concert to subvert the voluntarist assumptions that are still 
deeply imbued in sovereignty. Part 1 opens with a short discussion of voluntarism and its place in 
theories of sovereignty. Part 2 highlights three strands within theories of constitutional pluralism that 
seek to escape from sovereignty’s voluntarism by elevating the importance of fundamental principles, 
reasoned dialogue and a spirit of co-operation. Part 3 discusses subsidiarity’s more straight-forward 
rejection of monolithic voluntarist authority.  
 
Part 1: Sovereignty’s Lingering Commitment to Voluntarism 
 
Bartelson wrote that the essence of sovereignty is to be found in the ‘unthought foundations of our 
political knowledge’8 and although there is not much about sovereignty that has not been beneficially 
thrashed out and reconsidered over recent years, perhaps the ‘unthought foundations’ of sovereignty 
itself, namely, its commitment to voluntarism, have somewhat escaped our gaze. Since theories of 
sovereignty, as manifestations of political voluntarism, take their cue from theological voluntarism, this 
section reflects on the nature of political sovereignty as shaped by earlier theological debates.9 
Theological voluntarism emerged out of a controversy about the nature of God’s power. On one side, 
the medieval scholastics believed that God’s power was grounded both in reason and in love, to such 
an extent that God could never will something that would violate the laws of reason or the requirements 
of love.10 God could not will that 1 + 1 = 6 no more than he could will genocide, because, in a strange 
way, God’s will was ‘bound’ by reason, ‘confined’ by his goodness, ‘limited’ by his love. This position 
– known as theological rationalism – entails certain corollaries. First, if God’s actions are not arbitrary 
then science can legitimately adopt an epistemic assumption that the universe has intelligibility: that 
there is meaning to be found in the intricacies of marine eco-systems or the way that the heart pumps 
blood around the body or the interaction between the parts of the atom. Presuming such intelligible 
order, the human person can come to know the universe through the exercise of her reason. Secondly, 
if legal rules are to complement the order of the universe, they need to rise to the same standards of the 
requirements of reason rather than emerge as dictates of will. Moreover, the laws promulgated by 
earthly rulers can be judged by reference to those authority-independent standards and, if necessary, 
critiqued and disobeyed on that basis.  
On the other side of the debate were theologians Duns Scotus and William of Ockham who 
advanced the theory of theological voluntarism which gained sway from the thirteenth century onwards 
and bequeathed a long-lasting legacy on Western civilisation.11 Theological voluntarism designated 
 
6 Paul Marquardt, “Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union” (1994) 18 Fordham International Law Journal 616. 
7 Gareth Davies, “Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time” (2006) 43 CMLRev 63; Maria 
Cahill, “Theorizing Subsidiarity: Towards an Ontology-Sensitive Approach” (2017) 15 ICON 201.  
8 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 4. 
9 Cf. Govert Buijs, ‘Que les latins appellant maiestatem: An Exploration into the Theological Background of the Concept of 
Sovereignty’ in Walker (ed.) (n1).  
10 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self (Basic Books, 2008) Chapter 1; Etienne Gilson, The Unity of 
Philosophical Existence (Sheed and Ward Ltd., London, 1938), Chapter 3. 
11 Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation (Belknap Press, 2012). 
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God’s will as ‘the ultimate cause of all things’;12 his will was so absolute that it brooked no limitations 
whatsoever. God could will that 1 + 1 = 6, and it would. He could will that the earth should rotate 
clockwise on its axis except for Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays when it should rotate counter-
clockwise, and it would. Being completely untethered to reason, God could act irrationally, arbitrarily, 
capriciously and vindictively, leaving human beings ‘stewing in a kind of permanent impotence as their 
agency is swamped by God’s arbitrary power’.13 That is to say, since God acts without reference to 
reason, his actions cannot be understood by reference to reason. As a corollary, science cannot operate 
on the basis that the universe (or marine ecosystems or the human heart or the atom) can be intelligibly 
understood. More importantly, the second corollary is that as God became ‘less frequently represented 
as the fullness of reason and goodness than as the site of sovereign will’, earthly power became 
‘reframe[d] and refract[ed]’ in the same way.14 After all, if God can exercise his dominion solely by 
reference to his will and ignoring every other consideration, why should earthly rulers allow their will 
to be constrained? Inevitably, then, political power was also cast voluntaristically, with priority given 
to the will while the laws of reason and even the effort to strive after goodness were pushed into the 
shadows. The seeds of sovereignty are to be found here: the theory of theological voluntarism proposed 
by Duns Scotus and Ockham in order to explain that God’s power is dominated by his will became the 
foundation for later theories of political voluntarism that describe political power as dominated by the 
will of the sovereign.  
Political voluntarism is exemplified in Jean Bodin’s masterpiece, Six livres de la République, 
both in terms of how he describes the purpose of sovereignty and in terms of how he dismisses the idea 
of a right of resistance. Bodin’s sovereign is proposed as the antidote to the civic disintegration of his 
time: in place of the layers of political authority typical of the medieval ordering of society, there should 
be one single ultimate source of absolute authority. Such a sovereign prince would not be subject to the 
commands of non-sovereigns,15 or to the laws of his predecessors, and or even his own laws.16 The 
primacy of will is evidenced in the description of sovereign will as ‘absolute and perpetual power’17 
and in the fact that its purpose is self-referential: ‘the main point of sovereign majesty and absolute 
power consists of giving the law to subjects in general without their consent’.18 Now, in fact, Bodin 
does not conceive of ‘absoluteness’ in absolute terms, advocating that the sovereign prince should 
honour his contracts and keep his oaths, even if he no longer wills to do so, partly as a matter of justice 
and partly in order to sustain relationships with contractual partners and addressees of the oaths.19 At 
the same time, he dispenses with the medieval right of resistance ‘no matter how wicked and cruel [the 
sovereign] may be’ on the basis that there is no objective standard of good to which he could be held to 
account.20 Thus, Bodin’s voluntarism is slightly compromised at the edges: he advises his sovereigns 
to honour justice and harmony in certain circumstances, albeit that sovereign power is not truly limited 
by appeals to reason or goodness or mercy because the highest purpose of sovereignty is achieved in 
the imposition of his will. 
Thomas Hobbes introduces his sovereign as the ‘power able to over-awe them all’,21 the one 
who is capable of inducing sufficient fear in the whole population that they will forego the demands of 
their own wills for the sake of the peace that comes through obedience to the commands of the 
sovereign. Hobbes’s sovereign is forged in the relational dynamic in which they ‘confer all their power 
and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men … submit their wills, every one to his will’.22 
The power of this sovereign Leviathan is more absolute than that of Bodin’s sovereign, since Hobbes’s 
sovereign is not required or even encouraged to act in accordance with any external standards of justice: 
‘nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be 
 
12 Gilson (n10), 75. 
13 Elshtain (n10), 26-7. 
14 Elshtain (n10) 27, 25.  
15 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth (Julian Franklin ed, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 11. 
16 ibid 12.  
17 ibid 1.  
18 ibid 23. 
19 ibid 8. 
20 ibid 120. 
21 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (John Gaskin ed., Oxford University Press, 1998), 83. 
22 ibid 114. 
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called injustice, or injury; because every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth’.23 The 
relational dynamic between sovereign and subjects is understood only in terms of a clash of wills (and 
not, for example, a disagreement about the requirements of the good) the resolution of which is always 
achieved in only one way as is made clear in the words that Hobbes puts into the mouths of the subjects: 
‘I authorise and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this 
condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner.’24 Hobbes’ 
embrace of voluntarism is also evident in the fact that he makes no distinction between a sovereign who 
comes to power by institution (in the manner outlined above when the subjects freely offer their liberty 
to Leviathan) and the sovereign who comes to power despotically25 and indeed, that he believes that, in 
the end, there is no distinction between sovereignty and tyranny: ‘the name of tyranny, signifieth 
nothing more, nor less, than the name of sovereignty’.26 This is a purer version of political voluntarism 
because there are no independent standards (be they standards of reason or goodness or order or love) 
against which to evaluate the commands of the sovereign. He simply rules howsoever he wills. 
Scholars who have advanced theories of sovereignty ever since have been keen to put 
significant distance between themselves and those initial proponents of sovereignty in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. As a result, sovereignty has undergone some major reconceptualizations, 
becoming ‘tamed’27 and ‘de-potentized’28 along the way. These revisions were inspired by the perceived 
danger of vesting ultimate power in a single pair of hands or a single institution and therefore the 
solutions similarly focused on increasing the number of persons in whom sovereign power is vested. 
One solution is to conceive of sovereignty as being vested in all of the people of the nation, emphasizing 
their role as constituent power, and assuming that when the people delegate power to institutions, the 
power held by those institutions is not sovereign power, but delegated competence. This solution 
effectively transfers power from the sovereign prince who wills to the sovereign people who wills but 
it still underscores the primacy of the ‘general will’.29 Another solution is to allow institutions operate 
on the basis of delegated competences but vest sovereignty in the state itself. In this case, although 
power is divided between institutions operating within the state, it presents a united and sovereign front 
to the outside world.30 Both solutions re-conceived of the relational dynamic within sovereignty by 
distinguishing between the site of ultimate authority and the site of ordinary decision-making. Whereas 
in the Hobbesian version the subjects surrendered both ordinary decision-making authority and ultimate 
authority to Leviathan, the dynamic interaction at play in popular sovereignty and state sovereignty 
gave ordinary decision-making authority to the institutions while retaining ultimate authority for the 
people or the state. As a result, voluntarism could be curtailed at the level of ordinary decision-making 
through the establishment of constitutional limits on the exercise of power, kerbing the will of 
parliament for the sake of human rights and controlling the exercise of executive power for the sake of 
democratic principles.  
This shift from personal or institutional sovereignty towards popular or state sovereignty 
therefore appeared to successfully tackle the dangerous effects of voluntarism by requiring that ultimate 
sovereign power be held more abstractly by non-institutional actors (‘the people’ or ‘the state’) while 
simultaneously ensuring that the ordinary exercise of power at the institutional level be subject to 
constitutional limits.31 However, since sovereignty did not vest at this institutional level, limiting the 
 
23 ibid 141. 
24 ibid 114. (Emphasis in original.) 
25 ibid 135. 
26 ibid 470. 
27 Jon Parkin, Taming the Leviathan: the Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England (1640-
1700) (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
28 Olaf Asbach, “Sovereignty between Effectiveness and Legitimacy: Dimensions and Actual Relevance of Sovereignty in 
Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau” (2006) 2 Eurostudia 1, 5. 
29 Cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (tr. GDH Cole, Dover Publications, 2003); Emmanuel Sieyès, 
“Exposition raisonnée des droits de l’homme” presented to the Constitution Committee on 20th July 1789.  
30 Cf. Alan James, Sovereignty Statehood: The Basis of International Society (Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
31 Many jurisdictions go so far as to limit the power of constitutional amendment, such that even when parliament and/or the 
people amend the constitution their ability to do so is restricted. Cf. Yaniv Roznai, “Unamendability and the Genetic Code of 
the Constitution” (2015) NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 15/13. However, the constituent power of the 
people is ultimately untouched by these limits and therefore although they, too, help to limit the dangerous effects of 
voluntarism, they do not finally displace it. 
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exercise of institutional power did not compromise sovereignty’s commitment to voluntarism. 
Moreover, since the people themselves were legally unlimited in the exercise of their constituent power 
and the state was legally unlimited in the exercise of its external sovereignty, sovereignty’s commitment 
to voluntarism was actually confirmed, rather than compromised, by these shifts. In short, while the 
solutions of popular sovereignty and state sovereignty appeal to us because that they put in place 
safeguards designed to protect individuals and communities from wilful and capricious exercise of 
political power within the state, they did not in fact rid sovereignty of its voluntarist assumptions. 
Transferring sovereign will to a more abstract level meant that the problem of voluntarism seemed to 
disappear, and therefore we paid less attention to it.  
 
Part 2: Pluralism’s Escape from Voluntarism  
 
Within the European Union, ironically, the movement from institutional sovereignty to popular or state 
sovereignty appears to be reversed, in as much as the conflicting claims to sovereignty have been played 
out in the caselaw of the Court of Justice and the highest courts at national level. The claims to direct 
effect and supremacy were great acts of will, motivated by a desire to make the rules of the common 
market count, but, more importantly, in those cases the Court of Justice established itself as the 
institution with the ultimate authority to determine the status of European law.32 It arrogated unto itself 
this kind of institutional sovereignty without declaring the sovereignty of the European Economic 
Community. Moreover, the attempt to move from institutional sovereignty to polity sovereignty or 
popular sovereignty, insofar as the project of the European constitution was designed to make those 
claims, has not yet been successful and the ascription of sovereignty to the European Union or the 
peoples of Europe as a whole would still be deeply controversial. For this reason, we still refer back to 
the claims of direct effect and supremacy and the claim to ultimate authority made by the Court of 
Justice: Europe’s sovereignty can only be described in institutional terms. Correspondingly, the 
responses of the national courts, even when they are based on (loose) interpretations of the national 
constitutions, still involved a shifting of sovereignty insofar as they entail an acceptance that it is the 
national courts who will ultimately decide on the characteristics of national sovereignty, as these courts 
also arrogate to themselves the authority to decide not only that European law should not be applied in 
the national legal system, but the terms on which they might make such a decision.33 As a result, the 
concepts of state sovereignty and popular sovereignty have lost much of their stature: they no longer 
describe the status of the member states and they do not describe the status of the European Union. 
Institutional sovereignty is back en vogue as the battle of the sovereigns is played out in courts all over 
Europe, with no sign that the end is in sight: to the contrary, ‘the ECJ shows no sign of discovering that 
the EU Treaties are in fact subject to constitutional law, and supreme courts [276] seem to be becoming 
only more assertive in their claims that Constitutions determine what applies within the national 
jurisdiction’.34 
Undoubtedly, this movement from popular or state sovereignty back to institutional sovereignty 
has represented a significant challenge for democracy and constitutionalism and has risked alienating 
popular support for the European project. At the same time, as far as sovereignty theory is concerned, 
this movement from popular or state sovereignty back to institutional sovereignty may in fact be helpful 
because it reveals exactly what conceptions of popular and state sovereignty managed to obscure: that 
is, how much sovereignty is still in thrall to voluntarism. Moreover, the battle of the sovereign courts 
forces us to come to terms with the reality of the problem of voluntarism. Walker captures this best 
through his acknowledgement of ‘incommensurability of the knowledge and authority (or sovereignty) 
claims’ emanating from the courts, which incommensurability is the result of the fact that each has a 
 
32 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Sovereignty and the Supremacy Doctrine at the European Court of Justice’ in Walker (ed.) (n1). 
33 Cf. Maria Cahill, “Ever Closer Remoteness of the Peoples of Europe? Limits on the Power of Amendment and National 
Constituent Power” (2016) 75 CLJ 245. The decision of the Irish Supreme Court in the case of Crotty v. an Taoiseach [1987] 
IR 713 is exceptional in this regard because it defended popular sovereignty by requiring a referendum prior to treaty 
ratification, but this position has been weakened by the more recent decision of Pringle v. Government of Ireland [2012] IESC 
47. Maria Cahill, “Crotty after Pringle: The Revival of the Doctrine of Implied Amendment” (2014) 17 Irish Journal of 
European Law 1. 
34 Gareth Davies, ‘Constitutional Disagreement in Europe and the Search for Pluralism’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek 
(eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, 2012), 275-6. 
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‘different epistemic starting point’, and which in turn means that ‘there is no neutral perspective from 
which their distinct representational claims can be reconciled’.35 Sovereignty, based on voluntarism, 
conceived of politics as the clash of contradictory wills, and supposed that that clash could be resolved 
only when one will was subjugated to the other. Such a crude and unsophisticated approach seems to 
be both an unrealistic and an undesirable solution here. That means, however, that we need to find a 
way out of voluntarism.  
Theories of pluralism have been canvassed for about twenty years in European scholarship36 
and although they may not expressly engage with the theory of political voluntarism, nonetheless they 
do propose significant changes to the way in which the authority of the highest courts and the Court of 
Justice should be exercised. In order to give supreme priority to the will, theological and political 
voluntarism tended to ignore the importance of the rule of reason, the requirements of love or the effort 
to seek the good. Theories of pluralism, contrariwise, urge courts to yield their will for the sake of a 
higher prize, by downplaying the importance of will and giving increasing priority to other elements. 
One strand within pluralism gives increasing priority to the good by means of an emphasis on certain 
fundamental principles for the sake of which courts should be prepared to sacrifice their claim to 
ultimate authority. A second strand gives increasing priority to reason by conceiving of the interaction 
between the courts as a fruitful exchange of ideas rather than a hapless clash of wills. A third strand 
gives increasing priority to relational aspects, by means of a focus on co-operation and self-restraint. 
These three strands within pluralism, discussed in some detail below, constitute a novel challenge to 
sovereignty because they drive a wedge between authority and will, conditioning sovereignty by 
reference to (1) fundamental principles (2) reasoned dialogue and (3) co-operative spirit. 
 
Sovereignty conditioned by Fundamental Principles 
 
The first strand within pluralism appeals to fundamental principles: the central point is that the question 
of who gets to exercise authority fades in significance when attention is turned to the principles that are 
at stake. The self-understanding of the courts should therefore be conditioned by reference to these 
fundamental principles: they should see themselves as acting in the service of those fundamental 
principles and gladly recognize and welcome the efforts of other courts who do the same. The good 
being promoted by those fundamental principles should matter more to them than their own claim to 
sovereignty. This kind of pluralism finds its home in those decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
which championed human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and declared that the Court would be 
willing to accept the authority of the Court of Justice provided those fundamental principles were upheld 
by European law.37 In these decisions, as Weiler noted, ‘the German Court presents itself as a guarantor 
of the universal values of democracy rather than as a guarantor of German particularism’.38 Mattias 
Kumm’s theory is the best example of this kind of pluralism that conditions sovereignty for the sake of 
fundamental principles. He recognizes that ‘a set of universal principles central to liberal democratic 
constitutionalism undergird the authority of public law and determine which norms take precedence 
over others in particular circumstances’.39 These ideals are recognized by national constitutional 
traditions as well as European law because they are the ‘common heritage of the European constitutional 
tradition as it has emerged in the second half of the twentieth century’40 and they have ‘universal moral 
validity’.41 Thus it is right and just that they should take centre-stage. As a result, the authority claim of 
 
35 Neil Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (2002) 65 MLR 317, 338.  
36 This chapter does not specifically address the concept of constitutional pluralism, but remains sceptical about the viability 
of such a concept. Cf. Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context’ in Avbelj and Komárek (n34); Matej 
Avbelj, ‘Can European Integration be Constitutional and Pluralist – Both at the Same Time?’ in Avbelj and Komárek (n34).  
37 Case 2 BvL 52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH. v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1974] 2 CMLR 540; Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225; Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Brunner v. the 
European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57.  
38 Joseph Weiler, “Does Europe need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht decision” (1995) 1 ELJ 222.  
39 Mattias Kumm, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Avbelj 
and Komárek (n34), 54.  
40 Mattias Kumm, “Beyond Golf Clubs and the Judicialisation of Politics: Why Europe has a Constitutional Properly So 
Called” (2006) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 505, 517.  
41 Kumm, Mattias, “The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the 
Constitutional Treaty” (2005) 11 ELJ 262, 286-7. 
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the national courts can no longer be understood in terms of sovereign will: it is re-cast in terms of how 
well they ‘embody and help realize’ those universal principles and ideals principles.42  
In practical terms, this has two implications. First, if the ultimate purpose of the national courts 
is to promote adherence to these universal moral principles, then, in their day-to-day operations it is 
unreasonable to ignore the jurisprudential relevance of non-national decisions informed by those same 
ideals.43 There can be no longer be a sharp distinction between state law and international law.44 Rather, 
a holistic approach to the question of sources of law is required as each court tries to ‘make sense of 
what the best understanding of the competing principles in play requires them to do’.45 This means then 
that conflicts between national courts and the Court of Justice are theoretically unlikely, and any that 
remain are ‘not deep and hard, but shallow and soft’ because they rest on the foundation of the shared 
commitment to these principles that ‘serve as a common framework to mediate potential disputes’.46 
Nonetheless, disputes may still arise: the second implication is that the motivation for the non-
application of European law is now ‘justified’ by reference to the principle that is at stake.47 No longer 
a clash of sovereign wills, the entire dispute is reframed in terms of differing approaches to the 
achievement of shared moral commitments which the courts recognize as more important than their 
own claims to authority. Kumm’s theory has therefore roundly rejected sovereignty’s voluntarism and 
re-conceived authority as being grounded in propensity to achieve the good.  
Although he does not consider himself to be a pluralist, Julio Baquero Cruz’s approach 
resonates strongly with Kumm’s insofar as he also conditions sovereignty by reference to fundamental 
principles and justifies the non-application of European law in these terms. His theory of institutional 
disobedience understands that national courts opt for non-application of European law (‘an 
extraordinary escape valve’48) not in protest against the sovereignty claim of the Court of Justice but as 
a form of conscientious objection to a particular European law which threatens a higher principle that 
is enshrined in all the national and European legal orders. Because of its status and self-understanding 
as a vindicator of these ‘higher moral rules’, a national court’s non-application of European law should 
not be understood as a trenchant defence of the national court’s claim to sovereignty but rather as a plea 
for reconsideration and reform of the particular law.49 Therefore, like Kumm, Baquero Cruz is 
conditioning sovereignty by reference to the good, for the sake of fundamental principles.    
 
Sovereignty conditioned by Reasoned Dialogue  
 
The second strand within pluralism appeals to the power of better arguments and seeks to re-conceive 
the interaction between the Court of Justice and the national courts as a forum for reasoned dialogue. 
This strand was introduced by the work of Miguel Poiares Maduro, who seeks to articulate the 
operational principles that will allow and sustain a productive ‘multilogue’ between the European Court 
of Justice and national courts.50 They are the ‘principles of contrapunctual (sic) law’ or ‘meta-
methodological principles’51 and they comprise (1) pluralism, (2) consistency and coherence, and (3) 
universalizability.52 Implementing these principles in their day-to-day operations, courts should arrive 
at their decisions (1) bearing in mind the existence of plural sites of judicial authority, (2) seeking to 
achieve coherence among those various courts and (3) drawing on the precedents of other courts who 
have previously interpreted the laws at issue and also, by using arguments that are not specific to one 
jurisdiction and by taking into account the effects that a decision might have in other jurisdictions, 
justifying decisions ‘in a manner that could be universalizable’.53 Will is thereby conditioned by reason, 
 
42 Kumm, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority’ (n39), 64. 
43 Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict’ (n41), 286-7. 
44 Kumm, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority’ (n39), 64. 
45 ibid 56. 
46 ibid 64. 
47 ibid 55.  
48 Julio Baquero Cruz, ‘Legal Pluralism and Institutional Disobedience in the European Union’ in Avbelj and Komárek (n34), 
256. 
49 ibid 265. 
50 Poiares Maduro, Miguel, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in Walker (n1), 501, 524. 
51 Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek, “Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism” EUI Law Working Paper 2008/21.  
52 Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law’ (n50), 524-531. 
53 ibid 530.  
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and the requirement of universalizable justification. Jan Komárek develops this reason-oriented strand 
within pluralism in his efforts to create the conditions of dialogue that allow better arguments can be 
generated, heard and discussed, and so on. He disputes Poiares Maduro’s focus on institutional choice 
because that in turn emphasizes institutional sovereignty and the ‘finality and irreversibility of the 
decisions taken by particular institutions’.54 Instead, he endorses the application of theories of 
constitutional dialogue which reinforce ‘circular exchange among various actors.’55 The advantage of 
these theories is that they declare that ‘no institution has a superior claim to define or protect a particular 
constitutional value’,56 thus encouraging a dialogue between institutions which ensures that ‘a better 
and more legitimate decision’ can be arrived at following the participation of all institutions, each with 
its unique mandate, competence and expertise.57 There is plenty of scope to develop and refine this 
reason-oriented strand within pluralism, in particular, by coming to terms with the implications that it 
has for legal certainty and the rule of law in respect of its approach to sources of law and hierarchy of 
laws, and by grappling with the distinction between a popular decision liable to attract institutional 
support and a controversial decision which is more correct from the point of view of legal reasoning. 
Nonetheless, this strand of literature already tracks a movement away from a conception of authority 
that is entrenched in voluntarist sovereignty and towards an understanding of authority as conditioned 
by capacity to engage in reasoned dialogue.  
 
Sovereignty conditioned by Co-operative Spirit 
 
The third strand within pluralism its is relational sensitivity, which is attractive to many people who 
welcome it as an antidote to sovereignty’s stubborn inflexibility, believing that ‘the only acceptable 
ethic of political responsibility for the new Europe is one that is premised upon mutual recognition and 
respect between national and supranational authorities’.58 Neil MacCormick, the ‘father of pluralism’ 
emphasized this co-operative aspect very strongly in his work, arguing that the Court of Justice and the 
national courts should try to avoid flashpoints through the use of circumspection.59 The former should 
therefore not make ‘interpretive judgments without regard to their potential impact on national 
constitutions’ and the latter ‘ought not to interpret their laws or constitutions without regard to the 
resolution of their compatriots’ to participate in the process of European integration.60 Through these 
efforts, a spirit of co-operation and mutual deference could come to define their interface, thereby 
creating the habits that would sustain harmony and co-operation between them and thereby move 
‘beyond the sovereign state’.61 While MacCormick’s thesis envisaged a mutually co-operative 
approach, Joseph Weiler’s theory of ‘constitutional tolerance’ seemed to allocate the burden of 
compromise to the national courts.62 While he held that the national courts are not ‘subordinate to a 
higher sovereignty and authority attaching to norms validated by the federal people’ and therefore not 
obliged to obey European law, nonetheless he maintained that they do obey the requirements of 
European law, responding to the invitation to do so with an ‘autonomous voluntary act, endlessly 
renewed on each occasion’.63 Within this perspective, the national courts pay a high price for co-
operation, however, more recently, both Xavier Groussot and Gareth Davies have transferred the burden 
of compromise to the Court of Justice, exhorting that the Court should practise ‘self-restraint’ for the 
sake of maintaining a successful relationship with the national courts.64 As far as Groussot is concerned, 
the Court should adopt a doctrine of deference to national identities, which entails ‘a light-touch review 
[that affords] a wide margin of appreciation/discretion … to the Member states’.65 For him, deference 
 
54 Jan Komárek, ‘Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Avbelj and Komárek (n34), 246. 
55 ibid  246.  
56 ibid  246. 
57 ibid  247. 
58 Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (n35) 337. 
59 Neil MacCormick, “The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now” (1995) 1 (3) ELJ 259, at 265. 
60 Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (OUP, 1999), 120.  
61 ibid 131; Neil MacCormick “Beyond the Sovereign State” (1993) 56 MLR 1.  
62 Weiler, Joseph, “A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices” (2002) 40 JCMS 563, 567-8. 
63 ibid 568. 
64 Xavier Groussot, ‘Constitutional Dialogues, Pluralism and Conflicting Identities’ in Avbelj and Komárek (n34), 336; Davies 
(n34), 277. 
65 ibid 338. 
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is particularly warranted whenever member states point to deeply-held national values that reflect their 
constitutional identity, for example, fundamental rights, social and employment policy and public order, 
particularly relating to moral, religious and cultural concerns.66 Davies develops a theory of ‘pluralist 
self-restraint’67 centred on the principle of proportionality. Since the Court of Justice is ‘in the position 
of supplicant’ (it needs the national courts to apply its law), he believes that it should bear the lion’s 
share of the responsibility for ‘developing EU law in a way that avoids conflicts in the first place’.68 It 
should therefore construct European law in such a way that shows ‘respect for and accommodation of 
the different national – and international – legal orders with which it must interact’.69 In practice, Davies 
argues, the principle of proportionality should be tweaked so as to include national autonomy, including 
policy formulation and implementation, as a value to be taken into account.70 Thus, the principle of 
proportionality could justify the non-application of European law in circumstances where member 
states could demonstrate that ‘amending their systems or policies to achieve their goals in a way 
compatible with EU law would either be unreasonably difficult or disproportionately harmful to other 
interests’.71 In terms of the overall architecture of European law, this version of pluralist self-restraint 
entails a renovation that would subjugate the principle of supremacy of European law to the principle 
of proportionality.72 The common aspect of these various approaches is that they all require an 
institution which might otherwise stand on its own sovereignty claim to put that claim to one side, 
exercising self-restraint and deference to the other in a spirit of sincere and mature co-operation. 
 
 
Part 3: Subsidiarity’s Rejection of Voluntarism 
 
For all of their effort to escape from voluntarism by introducing another dimension which should take 
precedence over sovereign will – be it fundamental principles, reasoned dialogue or co-operative spirit 
– these theories do not always succeed in fully extricating themselves from the grip of sovereignty and 
its monistic tendencies, and therefore slip back into endorsing the ultimate authority of either the Court 
of Justice or the national courts.73 Subsidiarity, too, has seemed at times to be allied to the sovereignty 
of the nation state. When it was initially embraced by the European project in the Maastricht Treaty, it 
was deliberately presented as a principle that signalled the political aspiration and legal claim of the 
nation state to hold onto its remaining authority.74 Subsidiarity was “pressed … into service as a damage 
control measure to reassure those suspicious of the growth of EU power”,75 because it was presented as 
“the great limiting principle that [would] defend national sovereignty against incursion by the ever-
expanding Brussels bureaucracy”.76 Promising to resist federalism, it gave a shot in the arm to the 
member states, because it gave the nationalist cause a European name and status – and therefore a sense 
of legitimacy, in European terms – that it heretofore did not have. However, the rhetorical power that 
subsidiarity came to hold was not at all commensurate with the manner in which it was implemented in 
the treaties. The principle enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht was designed so as to operate only in 
areas of shared competences and then merely to guide the decision, made exclusively by European 
institutions in the light of European objectives, about which decision-making level should exercise 
authority.77 Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty established the Committee of the Regions, which 
facilitated the European legislative institutions in engaging directly with the regional government levels 
 
66 ibid 339. 
67 ibid 272. 
68 Davies (n34), 277. 
69 ibid 272. 
70 ibid 281. 
71 ibid 281. 
72 ibid 281.  
73 Cf. Avbelj, ‘Can European Integration be Constitutional and Pluralist’ (n36); Alexander Somek, ‘Monism: A Tale of the 
Undead’ in Avbelj and Komárek (n34); Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “Pluralism and Integrity” (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 365.  
74 Ken Endo, “The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors” (1994) 44 Hokkaido Law Review 
652.  
75 Marquardt (n6) 626. 
76 ibid 617. 
77 Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version 1992), Aug. 31, 1992, art. 3b, 1992 O.J. (C 224) as 
inserted by TEU. 
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in the member states, bypassing the state level and overlooking state sovereignty. There have been 
minor adjustments to the principle of subsidiarity in the intervening years, the most noteworthy being 
the introduction of the Early Warning System in the Treaty of Lisbon, but here also the scope and 
application of the principle of subsidiarity remains to be finally determined at European level and 
according to European criteria and by European institutions, with only the possibility of very small, 
heavily demarcated and non-decisive input by national parliaments.78 In short, although subsidiarity 
was portrayed as the saviour of national sovereignty, the principle enshrined in the treaties was certainly 
not designed to turn that rhetoric into reality.  
In fact, that is as it should be. Sovereignty works on the basis that an institution (or a people or 
a state, in the more abstract versions of the theory) assumes ultimate authority onto itself by making a 
claim that is monistic, voluntaristic, self-referential, self-authorizing such that, on its own strength, the 
sovereign will overbears all other wills within a political community. Subsidiarity sharply rejects this 
approach by assuming multiple sites of decision-making authority within the same polity and calling 
for a capacity-based division of responsibility between them. No one institution should be allowed to 
monopolize decision-making and institutions need to demonstrate their capacity in order to be allocated 
responsibility. Thus, despite the rhetorical confusion, it is a commonplace, at least within academia, 
that subsidiarity actually undermines the sovereignty of the nation state. Marquardt argued in 1994 that 
although it would seem ‘in the short run’ that the principle of subsidiarity would protect the national 
claim, ‘in the longer term’, it would ‘contribute to the erosion of effective sovereignty and autonomy’ 
at national level because it disputes the idea ‘that the authority of existing states is somehow a good in 
itself’.79 Gráinne de Búrca similarly pointed out that by problematizing the notion of authority, the 
principle of subsidiarity displaces sovereignty’s assumption that ultimate authority can be claimed by 
and belong exclusively to the nation state.80 A corollary, noted by Nick Barber, is that national self-
determination which assumes that the nation is the only possible locus and addressee of political power, 
has also been forced to give way before subsidiarity.81 Welcoming the loss of monolithic sovereign 
statehood, Neil MacCormick rejoiced particularly in the opportunities it opened up for multiple levels 
and kinds of authorities, that is, for pluralism and, through pluralism, for subsidiarity, which ‘requires 
decision-making to be distributed to the most appropriate level’.82  
For many people, subsidiarity is immediately attractive for this admirably participative 
dimension: it involves many more institutions, which all have different mandates and operate at 
different levels, in the decision-making process. It thereby increases political participation, giving 
people a greater influence in the process by which decisions concerning them are made. As a result, it 
seems to offer great prospects for democratic flourishing; indeed, it is subsidiarity’s democratic 
credentials that make it so appealing to MacCormick and Barber, the former noting that subsidiarity 
‘points us to better visions of democracy than all-purpose sovereignty ever did’,83 and the latter arguing 
that subsidiarity ‘speaks to the empowerment of democratic institutions’ and allows ‘individuals … to 
be included in decisions relating to the exercise of public power’ because it tries to tie decisions more 
closely ‘to those affected by them’ using democratic criteria.84 Yet, before we get carried away with the 
democratic potential of subsidiarity, our sobering experience with the European principle of subsidiarity 
must be taken into account.  
The text of Art. 5.3 appears, at first blush, to want to hold the scales equally between local 
institutions, regional institutions, national institutions and European institutions, comparing their 
capacities under the headings of ‘sufficiently achieved’ and ‘better achieved’. On closer inspection, the 
provision indirectly discriminates against regional and national institutions because what is to be 
achieved is invariably an objective of the European Union. Since any single regional government or 
national parliament cannot typically achieve the objectives of the European Union (protection the 
 
78 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 
13, 2007, 2007 O. J. (C 306) 1, Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, art. 5. 
79 ibid 653. 
80 Gráinne de Búrca, “Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam” 7/99 Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 
(1999).  
81 Nicholas Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity” (2005) 11 ELJ 308.  
82 MacCormick (n60), 135. 
83 MacCormick (n60) 126. 
84 Barber (n81), 308, 323. 
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common market, harmonization of standards across the Member States, or so on), legislative measures 
aimed towards those objectives will – precisely as a result of the application of the European principle 
of subsidiarity and not in spite of it – necessarily remain the purview of the European institutions.85 In 
short, because Art. 5.3 is ordered towards the objectives of the European Union and therefore assesses 
the capacity of local, regional, state and European institutions based on how well each can achieve a 
European objective and because the European institutions have the most to gain from the non-
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, we end up in a situation where the so-called principle 
of subsidiarity has the effect of stubbornly retaining legislative power at European level and 
systematically excluding local, regional and national authorities from participation in legislative 
decision-making. Art. 5.3 is in fact a parody of a principle of subsidiarity: a tool of centralization rather 
than an instrument of decentralization, a mechanism for excluding participation of local, regional and 
national levels rather than a method of ensuring their inclusion, a principle which exacerbates the 
democratic deficit rather than alleviating it. One could even go so far as to say that Art. 5.3 has the 
effect of an anti-subsidiarity principle. However, the reason that Art. 5.3 fails as a principle of 
subsidiarity is helpfully illuminating. Although it clearly recognizes regional and national institutions 
as prima facie capable of making decisions, the assessment of capacity is scuppered by the fact that 
capacity is measured in terms of ability to achieve legislative goals, and the European legislator has 
both the monopoly on legislative goal-setting and the most to gain from the non-implementation of the 
principle of subsidiarity. Then, because subsidiarity’s ambition to increase political participation is 
thwarted by the European legislative goal setting monopoly, subsidiarity’s democratic dividends cannot 
accrue. The example of Art. 5.3 thus demonstrates that successful implementation of the principle of 
subsidiarity is predicated on avoiding a situation whereby the legislative goal to be achieved is 
determined exclusively by the institution which is systemically biased against the principle of 
subsidiarity.  
This example is particularly stark and therefore useful in demonstrating the problem, but the 
lesson that it teaches will not be surprising for anybody familiar with the philosophical commitments 
of subsidiarity and, in particular, its ‘ethic of assistance’.86 Its long history demonstrates abundantly that 
subsidiarity’s trademark is its loyalty to the primary units (sometimes known as ‘lower levels’) rather 
than the subsidiary units that offer subsidium or assistance (sometimes known as ‘higher levels’).87 
Elsewhere, I have proposed a theory of subsidiarity that stays true to its etymological and philosophical 
roots and which entails four principles:88 (1) the primary units89  must be granted the freedom to develop 
their own internal authority structures and the opportunity to indicate that assistance is needed from 
subsidiary units90 for the achievement of its purposes; (2) the subsidiary units have no right of initiative 
to intervene, except in the use of the override mechanism, justified in exceptional circumstances (for 
instance, when the primary unit is so weak or corrupt that it cannot objectively assess whether assistance 
is needed); (3) any assistance requested, offered and received must be ordered towards the promotion 
of the goals and objectives of the primary unit and the achievement of the good for which the primary 
unit was established, rather than the goals and objectives of the subsidiary unit; (4) to prevent the 
primary unit from becoming dependent on the assistance received, compliance and review structures 
should examine whether the assistance offered is ordered towards the growing strength and 
independence of the primary unit and guards against any tendencies of the subsidiary unit to overbear 
the primary unit. Only when subsidiarity is understood in this way – where the authority of the primary 
and subsidiary units are ordered towards the good of the primary units, although the primary units do 
not have exclusive authority to determine how that good is to be achieved – will it allow for genuine 
participation by multiple decision-makers and create the conditions for democratic flourishing. When 
 
85 Cf. Davies (n7) 73-75; Gareth Davies, “Subsidiarity as a Method of Policy Centralization” Hebrew University International 
Law Research Paper 11/06; Neil Walker, “Subsidiarity and the Deracination of Political Community: The EU and Beyond” 
Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2015/31, 8-10. 
86 Walker, (n85), 10. 
87 Cahill, (n7) 206-212. 
88 Cahill (n7) 214-216. 
89 For example, families, trade unions, charities, sporting organizations, companies, local government, and so on. 
90 Usually the state will be a subsidiarity unit, offering assistance to the primary units noted above. However, when the 
subsidiary unit is an international organization, like the European Union, then the state becomes a primary unit vis-à-vis that 
subsidiary unit.  
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we understand subsidiarity in this way, however, we decisively reject the voluntarist assumption behind 
sovereignty, because we marshal the authority of subsidiary units in the service of goals and objectives, 
and ultimately a good, that it does not define on its own terms.91 If Art. 5.3 were to be redefined 
according to this model, it would clearly echo the strands within pluralism by (1) conditioning authority 
for the sake of the good, although admittedly the good here is defined more concretely and less 
abstractly as the legislative goals and objectives of national and regional parliaments, rather than 
Kumm’s nebulous ‘fundamental principles’, (2) conditioning authority through reasoned dialogue, 
because this model assumes that the institutions at various levels engage in rational argument about 
whether the use of the override mechanism is warranted and what the outcome of compliance and 
review procedures should be, and (3) by conditioning authority for the sake of co-operation by fostering 




Although it is clear that conceptions of sovereignty have changed much since the pure theories of 
sovereignty were articulated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, revisions have focussed on 
increasing the number of people who exercise sovereign will (the shift from the sovereign prince to the 
sovereign people) and dividing sovereign power so that it is not vested in any one person or institution 
(separation of powers, internationalisation). Thus, sovereignty became no longer synonymous with the 
terrible image of Leviathan; it became popular, and in both senses of the word. What did not change, 
despite these sizeable modifications in sovereignty theory, was the conception of authority proposed by 
sovereignty: sovereign authority was still governed by will; it still endorsed voluntarism. Ironically, in 
the European context, the shift from institutional sovereignty to popular or state sovereignty has been 
reserved, such that the battle of the sovereigns is played out between Court of Justice and national 
constitutional courts. Theories of pluralism and subsidiarity propose solutions to this crisis of authority 
in Europe, acting in cahoots not only to deny the sovereignty of the nation state but, at a deeper level, 
to reject the voluntarist assumptions behind sovereignty, by undermining the importance of the will and 
conditioning the exercise of authority by reference to the good, reasoned dialogue and self-restraint for 
the sake of co-operation. 
 
 
91 The model laid out here seems to bear some resemblance to the models of communal subsidiarity and comprehensive 
subsidiarity as proposed by Neil MacCormick: MacCormick (n60) 151-5. 
